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1 Introduction 
Recent heating-up in the development race of Quantum Computers brings attention to secure 
communications which are resistant to Quantum Computers. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) 
has been said to be the most promising technology to protect communications from cryptanalysis 
even with Quantum Computers. 
On the other hand, Y00 protocol proposed by H. P. Yuen (its original name is αη) in 2000 1–3 
is compatible to conventional high-speed and long-distance optical communication technologies 
while it sends messages directly and hides them under quantum noise enhancing the security of 
conventional cryptographies 4–14. However, its security has not been well-understood except some 
evaluations by unicity distance 15, 16, numerical analyses by masking sizes that are the numbers of 
signal levels hidden under quantum noise 17, 18, or error probability in eavesdropping on individual 
signals 19. Therefore, since Fast Correlation Attack on Y00 protocol was found 20, 21, Y00 protocol 
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has been believed to be computationally secure while QKDs are Information-Theoretically secure, 
although a countermeasure “Irregular Mapping” was equipped on Y00 systems as a 
countermeasure to Fast Correlation Attack 22. 
This study gives the first example of security analysis on Y00 protocol with unlimitedly long 
Known-Plaintext Attack (KPA) by Quantum Multiple Hypotheses Testing Theory. It shows that 
Y00 protocol is secure with guessing probabilities on the two shared secret keys of 128 bits strictly 
less than one even under unlimitedly long KPA. However, as time passes the attack increases the 
guessing probability, hence fresh keys have to be sent instead of messages before Y00 
communication systems are breached. In this case, if the probability distribution of the provided 
fresh key is uniform, the guessing probability on the key has to be evaluated by Ciphertext-Only 
Attack (COA). There are still some assumptions in this study, therefore this study is not rigorous 
yet. However, it will give a better understanding of the security of Y00 protocol, and some insights 
for detailed future works. 
One of the major methods to evaluate Information-Theoretic security has been to calculate the 
guessing probability on secret keys since C. E. Shannon 23 and in the literature following 24, 25. 
Therefore, this study follows these concepts as well to evaluate the security of Y00 protocol. 
2 Known works on security evaluations on Information-Theoretic Secure Cryptography 
The founder of the Information Theory, C. E. Shannon proved that there is that “perfect secrecy” 
is satisfied only when the length of the encryption key k with its probability distribution 
Independent and Identically-Distributed (IID) has to be longer than the plaintext x, which is One-
Time Pad (OTP) 23. Then the ciphertext string c is given by the modulo-2 addition of x and k. 
  (mod2) x k c . (1) 
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Therefore, 
    Pr | Prx c x . (2) 
In 2012, M. Alimomeni and R. Safavi-Naini proposed “Guessing Secrecy,” generalizing 
Shannon’s concept 24; the encryption is not perfectly secure, but the key is obtained only 
probabilistically by Eve’s guess as 
      Pr max Pr | max Pr   x X x Xc C c x c x . (3) 
In 2013, M. Iwamoto and J. Shikata proposed “Worst-case Guessing Secrecy” 25, considering the 
worst scenario such as 
        , ,max Pr | max Pr  x Xx c X C x c x . (4) 
Therefore, this study follows the above concepts “guessing probability on the key” to evaluate the 
security of Y00 protocol. 
3 Security of Conventional Stream Ciphers under Long Known-Plaintext Attack 
This section treats the security of conventional stream ciphers with KPA; those are not randomized 
by quantum noise to give a better understanding on the security of Y00 protocol which is a stream 
cipher randomized by quantum noise. In conventional stream ciphers, a shared secret key k is fed 
into the Pseudo-Random-Number Generator (PRNG) to generate a key stream s. A plaintext string 
x from a sender, Alice, is converted into a ciphertext string c = x + s mod 2. To decode c, the 
receiver, Bob, feeds the shared k into his common PRNG, then recovers x = c + s mod 2. If Eve 
has the same PRNG and knows x during a period of s, she obtains s completely, hence her 
correspondence table of k ↔ s recovers the original key k no matter how much computationally 
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complex the key expansion process is. Then, Eve can read all messages from the next period. In 
terms of conditional probability, this means, 
    Pr | , Pr | , 1 s c x k c x . (5) 
4 Security of Y00 under KPA during Least Common Multiple of PRNGs’ Periods 
This section describes the security of Y00 protocol with KPA during the Least Common Multiple 
(LCM) of the two PRNGs’ periods using Quantum Multiple Hypotheses Testing Theory 26, 27. 
4.1 Principles of Binary Y00 Quantum Stream Cipher 
To start Y00 protocol, the legitimate users Alice and Bob have to share a secret key k. Then they 
expand k into a key stream s using a common PRNG equipped in each transmitter/receiver. Then 
s is chopped every log2 M bits to form M-ary string s(t) of time slot t, while a message bit x(t) is 
encoded into a coherent state [ ( )] m t  using s(t) as 
     ( ) : Map ( ) Map ( ) ( )mod 2  m t t M t x ts s . (6) 
Map[s(t)] is a projection from s(t) to Map[s(t)] ∊ {0, 1, 2, 3, … , M – 1}. Therefore, the message 
bit x(t) ∊ {0, 1} corresponds to a set of quantum states  [ ( )] , [ ( ) ]  m t m t M  for even number 
Map[s(t)], otherwise  [ ( ) ] , [ ( )] m t M m t . On the other hand, Bob’s receiver sets an optimal 
threshold(s) to discriminate the set of quantum states. Therefore he decodes x(t) since he knows 
Map[s(t)] thanks to the common PRNG and the shared k. On the other hand, the eavesdropper, 
Eve, has to discriminate 2M-ary signals hidden under overlapping quantum and classical noise 
since she does not know whether Map[s(t)] is even or odd, hence x(t) neither. 
When Eve launches Known-Plaintext Attack (KPA), a number of the hidden signal level under 
noise effectively halves, hence it might help Eve to guess k. 
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To avoid the situation, Overlap-Selection-Keying (OSK) was proposed 28. An additional 
common PRNGs with another shared key Δk are equipped in both a transmitter and a receiver to 
randomize the plaintext x with pseudo-random number Δx as 
     ( ) : Map ( ) Map ( ) ( ) ( )mod 2    m t t M t x t x ts s . (7) 
Then the transmitter Alice sends a coherent state ρ(m(t)) with classical randomizations named DSR 
and DER 19 although these are omitted in this study for simplicity. 
Eve obtains coherent states separated from a beam-splitter ρ′(m(t)) and stores its time sequence 
in her quantum memory. Denote the quantum sequence ρ′(x, s, Δx) with the splitting ratio η as 
      
1
0
, , : , , , ,  [ ( )] [ ( )]    


     
T
t
m t m tx s x x s x x s x . (8) 
Note that a set of (s, Δx) ∊ (S, ΔX) is generated from (k, Δk) ∊ (K, ΔK). Therefore there are only 
2|K|+|ΔK| patterns of single sequences, although the number of single levels is 2M and the period of 
KPA is T. Hence, what Eve needs is not 2M‧T-ary quantum decision theory but 2|K|+|ΔK| -ary one, no 
matter how long the key-stream lengths of s and Δx are. Therefore the main problem is whether 
Eve can determine the correct (s, Δx) in the LCM of the periods of (s, Δx), denoted as TLCM, like 
in case of the conventional stream cipher explained in Sec.3 or she needs longer than TLCM. 
4.2 Brief Description of M-ary Quantum Detection Theory 
Before this section starts, here are some assumptions to be satisfied. 
- The projection Map[‧] stays unchanged during the running of Y00 protocol. 
- Map[‧] is known to Eve according to the Kerckhoffs' principle, as known as Shannon’s Maxim. 
- Map[‧] is well-designed irregular mapping so that quantum noise covers all bits in s(t) equally. 
The set of Eve’s measurement operators {E(s, Δx | x)} satisfies 
  
( , ) ( , )
, |
  
  E Is x S X s x x . (9) 
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By Born rule, the measurement operator E(s′, Δx′ | x) gives Eve a measurement result (s′, Δx′) ∊ 
(S, ΔX) from a quantum state ρ′(x, s, Δx) with a probability of 
      tr , | , , Pr , | , ,           E s x x x s x s x x s x . (10) 
Quantum multi-hypotheses testing theory based on the Bayes criterion is applicable to decide 
which (s′, Δx′) is the most possible. Let the Bayes cost in the theory be as described in Eq.(11). 
   , ,, , , | :        C s s x xs x s x x . (11) 
When the prior probability is Pr(s, Δx), the average Bayes cost is 
        , ,( , ),( , ) ( , )Ex Pr , tr , , , |                  C Es s x xs x s x S X s x x s x s x x . (12) 
The Hermitian risk operators are 
 
      
         
, ,( , ) ( , )
, , : Pr , , ,
Pr , , , Pr , , , , ,
  
  
    
      
                  
W s s x xs x S Xx s x s x x s x
s x x s x s x x s x x s x
. (13) 
To minimize Eve’s error probability, the necessary-and-sufficient conditions are 26 
        , , , | , | , , 0            W E E Wx s x s x x s x x x s x . (14) 
        , | , , , , , |           E W W E 0s x x x s x x s x s x x . (15) 
  , , 0  W x s x . (16) 
        
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
: , | , , , , , |
     
       E W W Es x S X s x S Xs x x x s x x s x s x x . (17) 
Then Eve’s maximum success probability of obtaining the correct (s, Δx) is, 
 
   
       
( , ) ( , )
Pr , | , , 1 1 tr tr
Pr , , , , | , , 
  
        
     Es x S X
s x x s x
s x x s x s x x x s x
. (18) 
Now, denote E(s, Δx | x) as 
      , | : , | , |   E s x x s x x s x x . (19) 
From Eq.(15), 
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         
         
Pr , , | , , , , , |
Pr , , | , , , , , |
 
 
         
        
s x s x x x s x x s x s x x
s x s x x x s x x s x s x x
. (20) 
For pure states, from Eq.(8), 
        
2
( , ) ( , )
, , , , 1 , , , |  
  
           s x S Xx s x x s x x s x s x x . (21) 
Therefore, Eq.(20) gives 22|K|+2|ΔK| – 2|K|+|ΔK| equalities and Eq.(21) gives 2|K|+|ΔK| equalities. Thus, 
there are 22|K|+2|ΔK| equations in total, while there are 23|K|+3|ΔK| variables including {Pr(s, Δx)}. 
 To remove remained variables {Pr(s, Δx)}, apply Cauchy–Schwarz inequality to Eq.(18). 
 
     
     
2
( , ) ( , )
1/21/2 42
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
tr Pr , , , , |
Pr , , , , |


  
     
     
     
    

 
s x S X
s x S X s x S X
s x x s x s x x
s x x s x s x x
. (22) 
Let Eve know the prior probability Pr(s, Δx) under Shannon’s Maxim. Then Eve can choose her 
{E(s, Δx | x)} so that the equality of Eq.(23) is satisfied. 
  
   
   
2
2
( , ) ( , )
, , , |
Pr ,
, , , |


  
 
 
  s x S X
x s x s x x
s x
x s x s x x
. (23) 
Therefore the prior probability distribution {Pr(s, Δx)} vanishes as follows. 
  
   
   
4
( , ) ( , )
2
( , ) ( , )
, , , |
max tr
, , , |


  
  
 
  
 


s x S X
s x S X
x s x s x x
x s x s x x
. (24) 
The condition Eq.(23) satisfies Eq.(14) trivially, and Eqs.(15, 16) are converted as follows. 
 
           
           
2
2
, , , | , | , , , , , |
, , , | , | , , , , , |
  
  
              
       
x s x s x x s x x x s x x s x s x x
x s x s x x s x x x s x x s x s x x
. (25) 
 
         
       
2
( , ) ( , )
4 4
( , ) ( , )
, | , , , | , , , |
, , , | , , , | 0

 
  
  
       
       


W
s x S X
s x S X
s x x x s x s x x x s x s x x
x s x s x x x s x s x x
. (26) 
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Therefore, Eq.(26) originated from Eq.(16) is also satisfied while a new condition is Eq.(25). The 
absolute value of Eq.(25) is 
 
       
       
4 2
4 2
, , , | , | , ,
, , , | , | , ,
 
 
        
     
x s x s x x s x x x s x
x s x s x x s x x x s x
. (27) 
4.3 Security of Y00 under KPA on Secret Key: in case of Exact Signal Detections for Eve 
Although it is impossible for Eve to obtain the correct signal sequence without any errors because 
of quantum noise in Y00 protocol, it is worth to consider an imaginary case where Eve could detect 
signals without any errors to compare Y00 protocol with conventional stream ciphers in Sec.3. 
 The situation where Eve could detect signals without any errors is that, from the Born rule, 
    
2
, | , , 0       s x x x s s x x . (28) 
Eq.(28) also implies from Eq.(21) that 
        
2
, , , , 1 , , , |          x s x x s x x s x s x x . (29) 
Then, from the left-hand side of Eq.(22), 
      
   
2
, ,
tr Pr , , , , | 1
  
       s x S X s x x s x s x x . (30) 
Therefore, through one period of (s, Δx), that is TLCM, Eve would obtain the correct (s, Δx) with a 
probability of 1. Then the situation is the same as conventional stream ciphers. Therefore, the effect 
of unavoidable quantum noise in Eq.(28) as a non-zero factor should play an important role in Y00 
protocol. 
4.4 Security of Y00 under KPA on Secret Key: in case of Erroneous Signal Detections for Eve 
Unless Eve’s detections are error-free expressed by Eq.(28), from Eq.(21), 
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    
2
, , , | 1   x s x s x x . (31) 
Therefore, Eq.(24) satisfies the following inequality as well. 
  
   
   
4
( , ) ( , )
2
( , ) ( , )
, , , |
max tr 1
, , , |


  
  
 
   
 


s x S X
s x S X
x s x s x x
x s x s x x
. (32) 
Even if Pr(s, Δx) is uniform, that is Pr(s, Δx) = 2–|K|–|ΔK|, since Eve has to make the success 
probability in measurement larger than the failure probability, 
        
2 2
, , , | , , , |       x s x s x x x s x s x x . (33) 
Then from Eqs.(21, 22), 
 
     
   
2
( , ) ( , )
2
( , ) ( , )
tr Pr , , , , |
2 , , , | 2


  
   
  
     
   


Δ Δ
s x S X
K K K K
s x S X
s x x s x s x x
x s x s x x
. (34) 
Therefore, Eve has an advantage in obtaining the correct (s, Δx) compared to pure-guessing. Thus, 
even Eve launches KPA using Quantum Multiple Hypotheses Testing Theory during a least 
common multiple of the periods of two PRNGs, she cannot pin-down the keys deterministically, 
far different from conventional stream ciphers. The problem is how long Y00 protocol stays secure. 
5 Security of Y00 Protocol under Unlimitedly Long KPA 
This section describes the security of Y00 protocol under unlimitedly long KPA so that Eve 
guesses the most likely key by Bayes Criterion 29. 
5.1 Y00 Protocol under Unlimitedly Long KPA 
Since (s, Δx) is pseudo-random of a period of TLCM while the plaintext x is supposed not to repeat, 
Eve can statistically confirm the most likely (s, Δx) during N‧TLCM periods as shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1 A time table of a set of variables (m, s, Δx, x). 
t 0 1 … T LCM –1 T LCM … 2T LCM –1 2T LCM … 3T LCM –1 3T LCM …
m m (0) m (1) … m (T LCM–1) m (T LCM) … m (2T LCM–1) m (2T LCM+1) … m (3T LCM–1) m (3T LCM) …
s s (0) s (1) … s (T LCM–1) s (0) … s (T LCM–1) s (0) … s (T LCM–1) s (0) …
Δx Δx (0) Δx (1) … Δx (T LCM–1) Δx (0) … Δx (T LCM–1) Δx (0) … Δx (T LCM–1) Δx (0) …
x x (0) x (1) … x (T LCM–1) x (T LCM) … x (2T LCM–1) x (2T LCM) … x (3T LCM–1) x (3T LCM) …  
At the n-th period of n ∊ {1, 2, 3, …, N}, Eve measures coherent states ( , , ) nx s x  with a set 
of operators denoted as {E(s, Δx | xn)} based on known plaintext xn, 
        , , , | , | , , 0            n n n nW E E Wx s x s x x s x x x s x . (35) 
        , | , , , , , |           n n n nE W W E 0s x x x s x x s x s x x . (36) 
  , , 0  n nW x s x . (37) 
        
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
: , | , , , , , |
     
       n n n n nE W W Es x S X s x S Xs x x x s x x s x s x x . (38) 
Since Eve just performs 2|K|+|ΔK|-ary quantum hypotheses testing to obtain (s, Δx) based on known 
xn, the results are independent of n. Therefore, from the Born rule, define as follows. 
      
2
0, | , , : Pr , | , ,        n ns x x x s x s x x s x . (39) 
 
0 :  n . (40) 
Suppose that Eve has obtained n(s, Δx) times of her measurement result (s, Δx) during N‧TLCM 
periods, then such a probability is 
    
 
 
 ,,
0 ( , ) 0 0Pr ( , ) | , , : Pr , | , , 1 Pr , | , ,
 
          
N nn
N nn C
s xs x
s xs x x s x s x x s x s x x s x . (41) 
At the boundary where Eve makes a wrong decision, Bayes Criterion requests Eq.(42), 
        Th 0 Th 0Pr , Pr | , , Pr , Pr | , ,       n ns x x s x s x x s x . (42) 
Two nearest probability distributions give the following boundary conditions. 
       ThTh
ThTh 0 0 0
Pr | , , Pr , | , , 1 Pr , | , ,

         
N nn
N nn Cx s x s x x s x s x x s x . (43) 
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       ThTh
ThTh 0 0 0
Pr | , , Pr , | , , 1 Pr , | , ,

              
N nn
N nn Cx s x s x x s x s x x s x . (44) 
Substituting Eqs.(43, 44) into Eq.(42), nTh is given in Eq.(46). 
 
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Th 0
2
Th 0
0 0
2 Th 2 Th 2
0 0
Pr , Pr | , ,
log 0
Pr , Pr | , ,
Pr , Pr , | , , 1 Pr , | , ,
log log log
Pr , Pr , | , , 1 Pr , | , ,
 

    
     
   
          
n
n
n N n
s x x s x
s x x s x
s x s x x s x s x x s x
s x s x x s x s x x s x
. (45) 
 
 
 
 
 
   
   
0
2 2
0
Th
0 0
2
0 0
1 Pr , | , , Pr ,
log log
1 Pr , | , , Pr ,
Pr , | , , 1 Pr , | , ,
log
Pr , | , , 1 Pr , | , ,
      

   

        
        
N
n
s x x s x s x
s x x s x s x
s x x s x s x x s x
s x x s x s x x s x
. (46) 
This situation is depicted in Fig.1. 
 
Fig.1 Schematic view of how the seucrity of Y00 system is evaluated by Eve’s failure probability. 
 
Since there are 2|K|+|ΔK| patterns of possible probability distributions, and only one is for the correct 
(s, Δx). Therefore, maximizing nTh by all wrong sets of (s′, Δx′) and defining it as max nTh, 
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    
 
 
 
 
Th
,max ,
( , ) 0 0, 0
Pr Fail Pr , | , , 1 Pr , | , ,
 
 
        
N nn n
N nn
C
s xs x
s xs x
s x x s x s x x s x . (47) 
Thus, Eve’s success probability in obtaining the correct (s, Δx) corresponding to the shared secret 
keys (k, Δk) in the Y00 system is Pr(Success) = 1 – Pr(Fail). 
To perform numerical simulation, all conditional probabilities {Pr(s, Δx |x0, s′, Δx′)} defined 
in Eq.(39) have to be determined. However, those parameters are dependent on implementations 
of Y00 systems including key-expansion algorithms. Therefore, this study gives numerical 
examples as follows. Assume initial key lengths are |K| = |ΔK| = 128 bits and 
    0 0Pr , | , , Pr , | , , :         ps x x s x x x x x x . (48) 
        2 1280 0Pr , | , , Pr , | , , 1 / 2 1                      ps s x x x s x s s x x x s x . (49) 
   2 128Pr , 2    s x . (50) 
The numerical simulation result with the above situation is shown in Fig.2. 
 
Fig.2 Schematic view of how the seucrity of Y00 system is evaluated by Eve’s failure probability. 
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As Eve’s success probability of obtaining the correct (s, Δx) in one TLCM smaller, Eve needs a 
larger number of N which is a repetition number of the period TLCM of the two PRNGs. However, 
note that even with p = 2–16, Eve needs N = 104 periods to pin-down the correct (k, Δk) with a 
probability of almost 1. When p = 2–64, even N = 107 periods are not enough for Eve, only allowing 
her to guess the correct (k, Δk) with a probability of about 10–13. Therefore it was shown that Y00 
protocol can go beyond the Shannon Limit of cryptography 30. 
While Eve’s success probability is small enough, Alice has to send fresh keys to Bob to 
continue secure quantum communications. In this case, Eve’s probability of obtaining the fresh 
keys has to be evaluated by COA with probabilistically known (k, Δk), that is, 
      
   new new new new, ,
Pr , Pr , Pr , | ,
  
     s x S Xk k s x k k s x . (51) 
6 Results and Discussions: Assumptions used in Security Analysis and Future Works 
In this work, it was shown that even a Y00 system with a few-hundreds bits of shared keys can be 
secure far longer than the period of its Pseudo-Random Number Generators, such as 107 periods 
if its implementations are well-designed. The security analyses in this study applied the following 
assumptions. 
1. Irregular-Mapping 3 makes quantum noise cover all bits in the chopped key stream equally. 
2. Irregular-Mapping is fixed and known to Eve during her eavesdropping. 
Hence, there are still necessities of further studies to give mathematically more rigorous analyses 
when the above assumptions are not satisfied. Also, the security of fresh keys is not given in this 
study yet. Hence it has to be analyzed in the next work. 
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Simulation code for Fig.2 on Mathematica 11.3 
ps[p_] := p; 
pf[p_] := (1 - ps[p])/(2^(128*2)-1); 
nth[n_, p_] := n*Log[2, (1 - pf[p])/(1 - ps[p])]/Log[2, ps[p]*(1 - pf[p]) / pf[p] / (1 - ps[p])]; 
prob[n_,p_] := 1 - CDF[BinomialDistribution[n, ps[p]], Floor[nth[n, p]]]; 
Show[ Table[ LogLogPlot[ prob[ Floor[m], 2^(-b)], {m, 1,10^6}, 
PlotRange -> {{1, 10^6}, {5*10^(-21), 4}}, Frame -> True, 
PlotLegends -> {Switch[b, 8, "p=2-8", 16, "p=2-16", 32, "p=2-32", 64, "p=2-64"]}, 
PlotStyle->{Switch[b, 8, Blue, 16, Orange, 32, Green, 64, Red]}], {b, {8, 16, 32, 64}}]] 
